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Abstract
Payment for Ecosystems Services (PES) programs which are considered as incentivized
mechanisms has been implemented in Latin America as a strategy to reduce deforestation by
rewarding landowners (sellers) to protect forests and to provide ecosystem services to ecosystem
users/beneficiaries (buyers).
Two common management structures for PES programs have been implemented in Latin
America: Government-financed and User-financed. User-financed PES programs are promoted
as being more environmentally effective and cost-effective compared with Government-financed
programs. Government-financed PES programs are perceived as less effective than User-financed
PES due to the inclusion of equity as a critical policy outcome of PES.
In this thesis, an analysis is conducted of the program structure of two PES programs in
the program’s ability to support environmental effectiveness, equity, and cost-effectiveness. Two
case studies were used in the analysis: the Costa Rica National PES Program, a Governmentfinanced program and the Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA),
a User-financed Program. This thesis also investigates the role of the type PES program structure
in the inclusion of equity in PES design and implementation.
The analysis indicated that the Government-financed PES program was better structure to
support higher indicators of environmental effectiveness, equity and cost-effectiveness. The
findings of the study showed that the program structure of PES is likely to influence whether equity
is included in the design of the PES. A Government-financed PES is more likely to include equity
as a policy outcome.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an analysis of the program structure of two PES
programs the Costa Rica National PES Program, a Government-financed program and the Los
Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA), a User-financed Program, in
the program’s ability to support environmental effectiveness, equity, and cost-effectiveness. This
thesis also investigates the role of the type PES program structure in the inclusion of equity in PES
design and implementation.

1.1

Deforestation in Latin America
Tropical forests “contain over half of the world's biodiversity” (UNEP-World Conservation

Monitoring Center, 1992, 1). Over fifty-percent of those tropical forests are found in the neotropics
(Butler 2012). The neotropical ecozone "extends from central Mexico in the north to southern
Brazil in the south, i.e., including Central America, the Caribbean islands and most of South
America" (Antonelli and Sanmartín, 2011,1). The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean
constitutes 25% of the world's forests and possess the highest biodiversity value in the world
(United Nations Environmental Program 2011, 4).
The rich biodiversity of Latin America's tropical forests is continuously under threat of
habitat and species loss and of species extinction due to unsustainable development. Chief
amongst the activities contributing to forest biodiversity loss is forest conversion for subsistence
farming, large commercial-scale agricultural development and logging. Between 1990 and 2005,
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the total deforestation rate in Latin America and the Caribbean was estimated to be 69 million
hectares (United Nations Environmental Programme, 2010, 1).
In the context of this thesis, deforestation refers to the “complete long-term removal of tree
cover” resulting from changes in land use (Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998, 3). It is undeniable
that deforestation, specifically tropical deforestation, is not simply a localized issue, but extends
beyond the borders of impacted countries. Tropical deforestation is a global concern due to the
projected future acceleration of habitat and species loss, human and infrastructure loss from natural
disasters, the increase of atmospheric carbon emissions driving climate change and the overall
domino effect of these changes on trade and economy, health, and regional and global security.
Tropical forest loss has a significant impact on global climate. Through the photosynthesis
process, tropical forests absorb 1.4 billion tons of the 2.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO2)
absorbed by carbon sinks (Schimel, Stephens and Fisher, 2014, 440). The tropical forests in Latin
America account for 84.2% of above-ground carbon stock. However, the reverse occurs in
deforestation as tropical forests become CO2 emitters contributing 3.7 billion tons of CO2 into the
atmosphere (Baccini, Goetz, Walker et al., 2012, 4). According to a 2007 report by the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), deforestation in Latin America and the Caribbean "was
estimated to be responsible for 48.3% of global CO2 emissions".

Chomitz et. al (2007) predict that the rate of tropical forest loss at 5 percent a decade will
be responsible for the addition of 3 billion tons of CO2 into the atmosphere each year,
causing many harmful consequences: “intensifying climate change; loss not just of many
species, but also entire ecosystems; and across the tropics, widespread changes in water
flows, scenery, microclimates, pests, and pollinators” (Chomitz, 2007, 1).
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The developing countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are in a quagmire between
the drive for economic development and addressing poverty, while at the same time protecting
critical tropical forests and their rich biodiversity. Significant efforts are being made at the
national, regional and global levels to develop and implement strategies to reduce forest
degradation and deforestation in order to address climate change.
The command-and-control approach has been the primary public policy option for
addressing environmental problems in Latin America and the Caribbean.1 However,
implementation of the command and control approach to addressing deforestation and forest cover
and biodiversity loss has not been effective (Bulte, Lipper, Stringer, and Zilberman 2008). As a
stand-alone strategy to natural resources management, this approach “often results in unforeseen
and undesirable consequences” (Holling and Meefe, 1996, 329).
Causes and drivers of deforestation are heterogeneous with complex interplays between
motivations and behaviors; this causal complexity makes command and control approach not as
effective. Geist and Lambin (2002) theorize that “multiple factors, rather than single-factor
causation” drive deforestation citing “economic, institutional, technological, cultural and
demographic outcomes with identifiable regional patterns of causal factor synergies” (Geist and
Lambien, 2002, 1).

A mix of policy options, including incentive-based mechanisms such as

payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs, have been implemented in an effort to support
the continued provision of ecosystem services, including those services provided by forests.

1

Command and control approaches to natural resources management, including forest management, use non-voluntary laws and
regulations to control changes to natural resources through setting standards, fines, etc. Command and control regulatory
approaches are in contrast to approaches that influence behavior by supporting voluntary participation, such as through the use of
incentives.
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1.2

Ecosystem Services

Ecosystem services are defined as the benefits people derive from ecosystems – the support
of sustainable human well-being that ecosystems provide (Constanza, d’Arge, de Groot, Farber, et
al. 1997; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) 2005)2.
There is a diversity of models for ecosystem services. This thesis will use the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment’s model, which groups the services into supporting, provisioning,
regulating and cultural. Using the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Ecosystem Services model
provides the best fit for the ecosystem services which are currently being incentivized based on
demand in payment for ecosystem services programs (Mayrand and Paquin 2004).

Figure 1: a) Millennium Ecosystem Assessment defined ecosystems. (b) Ecosystem services being sold/on demand from payment
for ecosystem services. Model shows the ecosystems services provided under payment for ecosystem services schemes

Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) defines ecosystems as a
“dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living
environment interacting as a functional unit.” In 2005, the United Nations concluded a five-year

2

Ecosystem services is also referred to as environmental services in some literature. The differences between the two terms is
defined in differing ways. One definition identifying the differences refers to ecosystems services as being the natural environment
while environmental services refers to both the natural and built environment (Bulte, 2008, 2410. Another definition is that
environmental services refers to specific, defined services while ecosystem services refers to systemic, synergies of services
(Wunder, 2008, 2).

5

global ecosystem assessment - the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA). One of the key
objectives of the assessment was to study the links between ecosystems and human well-being and
identify the impacts that changes to ecosystems have on the well-being of humans (Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Findings of the study found that 60-70% of the global ecosystems
evaluated were being “degraded or being used unsustainably” with potentially dire consequences
for the world’s poor particularly in terms of the provision of freshwater and arable lands
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report 2005, 20).
1.3

Incentivizing Forest Protection and the Management of Ecosystem Services

Conservation strategies, specifically protected areas, have been implemented throughout
Latin America as a key strategy for reducing deforestation rates and biodiversity loss. The results
have been mixed in reducing forest cover and biodiversity loss. To strengthen the support of the
public in avoiding deforestation strategies, incentivized strategies, including payment for
ecosystem services program have become the frontline public policy tool.

Due to the relation

between deforestation and poverty, further pressures to implement sound strategies are being
promoted by global agendas such as the Millennium Development Goals. Scaling up of PES has
occurred in the establishment of REDD+ (Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation in developing countries) which occurs at the country level (Pagiola 2011).
Constanza (1997) valued ecosystem services, estimated at between “$16 – 54 trillion with
the average being no less than $33 trillion, higher than the entire world gross national product”. A
2011 reassessment valued ecosystem services at an estimated US$125 trillion/year. Valuation of
ecosystem services is seen as critical to drive decision making and public policy development in
the management of ecosystem services (Constanza 1997). Further validation for valuation is made
in the context of incentivized initiatives such as payment for ecosystem services. It is argued that
6

for these initiatives to be effective, the value of the ecosystems services must be properly accounted
for.
Valuation of ecosystem services and incentivizing their management through payment for
environmental services is not without criticism as literature presents another perspective of
valuation as the commodification of ecosystem services (Huberman 2008; McCauley 2006; Kosoy
and Corbera 2010). The opposition to valuation and payment for ecosystem services raises
concerns of “property rights over ecosystem services” and failure to account for intrinsic or nonuse value (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010, 1234).
Constanza et al. (2014) and Farley and Constanza (2010) disagree with the position that
valuation equals commodification, positing that ecosystem services are public goods or common
pool resources that do not fit the privatization or conventional market model and that valuation
allows greater understanding of the importance of ecosystem services. As public goods, ecosystem
services are non-rival and non-excludable meaning they can be consumed without affecting the
opportunity for others to consume those same goods and services (Farley and Constanza 2010).
Ecosystem services are also considered as common pool resources (rival but non-excludable)
(Farley and Constanza 2010). Rival but non-excludable refers to ecosystem services that are not
infinite but are not closed off from any groups to use (Farley and Constanza 2010). Significant
implications for PES arise over differentiation in the category in which ecosystems services fits.
Club resources are more likely to be managed by a private entity or within a User-managed PES
program (Dunn 2011).
There is an exception to ecosystem services being public goods and common pool
resources. Some ecosystem services, such as watersheds, fall into a third category referred to as
“club resources”. Club resources are rival and excludable, therefore, ecosystems services which
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are club goods can be used amongst many people but there is not a deleterious effect on distribution
to others (Dunn 2011). However, as in a “club” with members, “non-members can be prevented
from using the services” (Dunn, 2011, 26).
Another concern raised overvaluation and creating market-based incentives as payment for
ecosystem services is the potential for the increase in issues of inequity in accessing resources and
further marginalization of the poor and indigenous people (Greig-Gran and Porras 2005). Further
implications for poor communities may arise in a User-financed program should equity/fairness
not be a high consideration in PES design
The issue of equity in payment for ecosystem services is explored further in this thesis as
a critical component of payment for ecosystem services design.
This thesis will contribute to research on payment for ecosystem services by analyzing the
effect of PES program structure on achieving environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness and
equity as outcomes of the program. The analysis will be conducted in the context of a Governmentfinanced PES and a User-financed PES program. In addition, I hope to contribute to a new line of
enquiry in evaluating whether the program structure of a PES determines the inclusion of equity
in the design of the PES as an intended outcome.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

A purposive sample approach (Randolph, 2009, p. 4) was undertaken to conduct the
literature review. The literature review is divided into two sections: (1) Payments for ecosystem
services as a conservation tool, and (2) existing work in evaluating program structures for payment
for ecosystem services with focus on research on decentralized or User-financed PES programs
and Government-financed PES programs and (3) the inclusion of equity in the policy outcomes of
PES.
2.0

Defining Payment for Ecosystem Services

Pagiola (2004) describes payments for ecosystem services “as a method of internalizing
the positive externalities associated with a given ecosystem or a specific resource use”3.
Externalities are “the costs and benefits which arise when the social or economic activities of one
group of people have an impact on another, and when the first group fails to fully account for their
impact” (Europe Commission, 1995). Using a hypothetical scenario of Farmer A and B: Farmer A
clears riparian forest upstream which results in increased sedimentation and turbidity in the source
of drinking water for a downstream community. This would be considered to be a cost or a
negative externality. In contrast, Farmer B decides to maintain a riparian buffer in a watershed
which increases the water quality for the downstream community. Farmer B’s actions are
considered as a benefit or a positive externality. Payment for ecosystem services targets the

3

An effect is internalised if the loss of welfare is accompanied by a compensation equal to the damage cost by the agent causing the externality.
European Commission, DG Environment (2000). A Study on the Economic Valuation of Environmental Externalities from Landfill Disposal and
Incineration of Waste Final Main Report. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/studies/pdf/econ_eva_landfill_report.pdf
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development of a positive externality through the “provision of ecosystem services” (Pascual,
Muradian, Rodríguez and Duraiappah, 2009, 3). The underlying concept for PES is that without
incentivizing the participation of landowners to change existing or potential land use behavior that
is degrading or damaging critical forests and their provision ecosystem services, a high risk exists
that those services would be lost (See Figure 3).

Figure 2: The logic of payment for ecosystems services. Source: Stefano Pagiola and Gunars
Platais, 2005

PES is one of the tools being used to correct the “failure of markets to value biodiversity
and ecosystems” (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, 2010, 15). The concept of PES
is that the traditional markets do not account for ecosystem services. Indeed, the PES model is
indicative of the shift in the attitude and decision making towards nature in general, and the
benefits of ecosystem services in particular, as being a public good with no quantifiable value
(Costanza, et. al. 1997).
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PES is categorized as a market-based approach whereby a value is placed on the benefits
of ecosystem services (in terms of payments made to provider), similar to any product being placed
on the market, and then charging end Users4. The common ecosystem services (Chomitz, Brenes
and Constantino 1998,Wunder 2008) included within payment for environmental programs are:
1. watershed protection
2. biodiversity protection
3. carbon sequestration and,
4. preservation of intrinsic values, e.g. scenic/landscape beauty
Ecosystem services may be sold as a “bundled” of services in a payment program (Wunder,
2005, 2) whereby an enrolled area of land is considered to be delivering several ecosystem services
(Mayrand and Pacquin 2004). “Bundling” is considered to be more efficient as the transactions
costs are reduced. Contrastingly, “bundling” is considered less effective in meeting environmental
targets compared with payments for individual services (Mayrand and Pacquin, 2004, 15).
2.1

The Economic Nature of Payment for ecosystem services

There is no single universally accepted definition of payment for ecosystem services.
However, the definition of PES by Wunder (2005) is widely referenced in literature (Forest Trends,
the Katoomba Group and UNEP 2008). The definition of PES by Wunder (2005) defines PES as:
1. a voluntary transaction where
2. a well-defined environmental service (or a land-use likely to secure that service)
3. is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) service buyer

4

Payment for ecosystem services is commonly defined as a market based mechanism. However, that categorization has drawn
criticism that PES does not fit the scope of a market based mechanism and some literature differentiates between PES and MES
(markets for ecosystem services). Vatn, A. An Institutional Analysis of Payments for ecosystem services. Ecological Economics 69
(2010) 1245-1252.
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4. from a (minimum one) service provider
5. if and only if the service provider secures service provision (conditionality).
The theoretical basis for Wunder’s five criteria and (generally speaking) the payment for
ecosystem services framework, is the Coasean theorem. Coasean theorem states that paredo
efficient (market efficiency) can be achieved where private individuals voluntarily reach an
agreement to address an externality. However, an agreement that internalizes the externality can
only be reached where property rights are clearly defined, there is an enforceable contract and the
agreed transaction/negotiation are low. Government’s intervention is only required to define
property rights.
However, the Coasean approach to PES is challenged as not being realistic to local realities.
Further criticisms have arisen citing the definition produced by Wunder (2005) as being more a
“theoretical reference point” (Vatn, 2010, 147) and that the “often perceived” Coasean approach
to PES is not reflected in the literature analyzing existing PES structures (Lapeyre and Picard,
2013, 10).
Farley and Costanza (2010) asserts that the foundation of Wunder (2005) definition - the
Coasean theorem - does not apply to all PES programs and emphasizes that “ecological
sustainability takes precedence over market efficiency.” The aforementioned position is supported
by Lapeyre and Picard (2013) observing that a review of the literature on PES shows that PES
arrangements “lean towards regulatory price changes e.g. subsidies” to effect change in land use
by landowners. Case in point, the Costa Rica National PES program is partially funded by fuel
and water taxes (Blackman and Woodward 2010). Financial input into the payments for ecosystem
services in Mexico is an earmarked US$18 million from water taxes towards PES and the World
Bank and Global Environment Facility have invested US$8 million in a regional integrated
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silvopastoral program between Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Colombia (World Bank 2008). Nonvoluntary contributions to PES for public goods may be necessary to prevent free riding (Jack,
Kousky and Sims 2007)
Vatn (2010) suggests that PES programs on the ground are a “mixed between Coase and
Pigou.” Ironically, the development of payment for ecosystem services was considered a shift from
the Pigouvian theorem which prescribed subsidies or taxes to achieve positive externalities
(Pattanayak, Wunder and Ferrano 2010).
Emerging from the discourse which describes PES as a mix of voluntary and non-voluntary
buyers, is an attempt to reshape the concept of PES. Muradian et al (2010) define payment for
ecosystem services as “a transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to create
incentives to align individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social interest in the
management of natural resources.”
It is highly relevant to discuss existing and emerging definitions of PES as the adoption of
one definition over the other guides the analyses/evaluation of PES programs. Subscribers to the
Coasean approach to PES are likely to determine that user-managed/private programs are more
effective and efficient than Government-managed/public sector programs5 (Wunder, Engel,
Pagiola 2008). In addition, the Coasean approach to PES supporters are less likely to view equity
as a critical part of the PES and more as a corruption of the efficiency of PES or as a “side
objective” (Wunder, 2008, 2; Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, 2008, 9). As Pascual, Muradian,
Rodríguez and Duraiappah (2009) point out “Coasean policy approaches tend to disregard equity

5

The Coasean approach advocates for limited Government involvement and lower transactions costs. Literature reviewed
showed that in Government versus User managed program, the Government managed programs had higher transaction costs
particularly due to the number of participants. Wunder, S, Engel, S and Pagiola, S. Taking Stock: A comparative analysis of
payments for ecosystem services programs in developed and developing countries (2008).
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issues since they are based on the premise that efficiency gains may be independent of the
allocation of property rights.”
Subscribers to a mixed approach to PES along the lines of the Muradian et al (2010) redefinition, give consideration to equity (poverty alleviation, protection of rights, etc.) into the
design of PES (Vatn 2010) and of equal value as effectiveness and efficiency in measuring PES
(Porras, Barton, Chacon-Cascante and Miranda 2013).
2.2

PES Framework

A PES program includes buyers/users, who are charged for the benefits that they derived
from environmental service; service sellers/providers who are compensated/rewarded/incentivized
for protecting forests which provide those ecosystem services (Wunder 2005) and intermediaries
brokering the payment program. Commonly in Government-financed PES programs, the buyers
are dispersed amongst a general population and financing for PES is indirect e.g. through water
tax. In contrast, in user-financed programs, the buyer is a direct beneficiary and financing for PES
is direct.
The other critical actor is the seller. PES’ fundamental theory is that without
compensation/reward/incentivizing of targeted landholders to adopt better land use practices, the
provision of the ecosystem services would be compromised. Property rights are one of the key
components of payment for ecosystem services. For a seller to be considered for inclusion in a
payment for ecosystem services program, the seller must have rights over the area to be contracted.
There has been an evolution of sorts in defining property rights from the requirement of strict land
title to the recognition of variations of land tenure (Lea and Mahanty 2009). Communal land
rights, which is the traditional method of land management amongst indigenous people, have also
been recognized for inclusion into PES programs as well as collective holding (Vatn 2010). The
14

requirement for property rights or land ownership in PES programs has raised concerns over
whether PES supports inequity by blocking poor farmers from entering into PES agreements or
cause the displacement of poor farmers due to land grab by richer, larger scale farmers (Vatn 2010).
Intermediaries are the third actors in PES programs. Their role may include acting as the
go-between the buyer and seller and function in a range of positions including as negotiator,
contractor, and administrator of the PES program (Huber-Stearns 2012). In national PES programs
such as in Costa Rica and Mexico, the Government often acts as the intermediary. However, even
in these programs, there are other smaller intermediaries which may act on the collective behalf of
sellers (Chomitz, Brenes and Constantino 1998).

Figure 3: The Flow of Compensation from Beneficiaries to Land Users in Payment for Environmental
Services. Source: Pagiola, S. and Platais, G. Environmental Strategy No. 2. The World Bank 2002.

The financing mechanism for payment for ecosystem services is used to collect and manage the
funds contributed into the program by the buyers/beneficiaries (Mayrand and Pacquin, 2004).
Financing sources vary amongst programs and may include: direct payment from beneficiaries and
taxes, subsidies, loans and grants particularly found in Government-financed PES programs.
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Markets for Ecosystem Services
In developing countries, the concept of the market is localized without services being sold
outside national boundaries. The exception is carbon sequestration. Carbon sequestration is traded
as carbon credits through the international carbon market which is supported by the Kyoto Protocol
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Arriagada and Perrings 2014).
2.3

Costs, Permanence, Leakage, Additionality

There are four major evaluative factors for payment for ecosystem services programs
efficiency and effectiveness: costs, additionality, leakage, and permanence. Costs in a PES
program includes (1) opportunity costs and (2) transaction costs.
Opportunity costs refer to the projected costs of a landowner forgoing economic activities
e.g. agriculture, cattle raising for activities such as afforestation, shade agriculture or no action
which protect the provision of ecosystem services. Transactions/implementation costs addresses
expenses that include negotiations, contract development, conducting baseline studies, monitoring
and enforcement and capacity building (Jack, Kousky and Sims 2007).
Measuring the effectiveness of a PES program requires the establishment of an accurate
baseline. The baseline is critical to determining what provision of ecosystem services have
occurred since the implementation of the PES, this baseline is called the counterfactual.

A

payment for ecosystem services should produce changes in land use supporting the provision of
ecosystems services – which is called additionality. The determination of additionality means that
without the implementation of PES, the land use change would not have occurred.
Leakage occurs outside the contract areas of a PES program and is directly linked to the
implementation of PES. Degradation and damaging activities to ecosystems within the PES
contract area spills over to adjacent areas. Payments for ecosystem services are generally
16

structured on a five-year participation period for participants. After this period, the goal is that the
landowners would continue with the provision of ecosystem services in the long-term (Wunder,
Engel and Pagiola 2008). When the long-term provision of ecosystem services is achieved,
permanence of the PES is indicated.
2.4

The Issue of Equity in PES Programs

Land rights and access to resources create power asymmetries, changing the power
structure by placing decision-making powers in the hands of those with resource rights (Kuponiyi
2008). Resource rights and access determines “allocation, costs and benefit sharing” (United
Nations Environment Programme,2012,8) and can create unequal access and asymmetric power
relations (Vatn 2010). The potential for marginalization and increasing inequities is ever present
in natural resources management (Quesada-Aguilar and Franks 2014). Often times it is the poor
or marginalized that bear the most costs and are displaced as they are the most resource dependent
for subsistence use as well as economic livelihood.
Equity in payment for ecosystem services is commonly perceived as morally and politically
significant, but negatively impacting the economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness of
PES (Pascual, Phelps, Garmendia et al. 2014). The early developmental phase of payment for
ecosystem services, equity and legitimacy were not part of the discussion (Corbera and Adger
2007) and the focus was solely on environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. Adger,
Brown, Fairbrass et al. (2003) states that in sound environmental decision-making, equal attention
must be paid to “efficiency, effectiveness, equity and legitimacy” as critical outcomes in project
design. Equity as a critical outcome in PES design is gaining traction, however, the debate rages
on whether or not the inclusion of equity considerations lessens the program’s effectiveness and
efficiency, and if the trade-offs are worth it.
17

How is equity defined and is it important for PES to work? There is no single definition
for equity as the perception of equity is not consistent across social groups (Quesada-Aguilar and
Franks 2014), but equity frameworks commonly refer to four dimensions of equity and principles
(McDermot, Mahanty and Schreckenberg 2012, Quesada-Aguilar and Franks 2014, Pascual,
Phelps, Garmendia et al 2014). The four dimensions of equity are (1) procedure, (2) distribution,
(3) recognition and (4) context. Figure 5 shows the principles for each dimension.

Figure 4: The three dimensions of social equity with context
encompassing all three.
Source: Pascual, Phelps,
Garmendia et al. 2014

The inclusion of equity dimensions as an equal weight with environmental effectiveness
and costs effectiveness can result in positive results including stronger legitimacy, improvement
in compliance and participation (Pascual, Phelps, et al. 2014). Beyond the potential for equity
actions in PES to support cost effectiveness, there is a moral obligation to protect the basic needs
of all people, including the poor and marginalized.
In the inception of PES as a conservation tool, the exclusion of equity was contrary to the
theoretical understanding of the program’s purpose in totality (Corbera and Adger 2007). Payment
for Ecosystem Services was envisaged as a conservation strategy that would not only be “more
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economically efficient and environmentally effective than previous strategies”, but it was
anticipated that PES’ that economic and social benefits would be fairly distributed (Corbera and
Adger,2007, 1). According to Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), because payment for ecosystem
services target is biodiversity conservation, the expectation is that the outcome would be positive
both environmentally and economically. Further assumption made is that the marginalized would
benefit.

These assumptions have created a vacuum in the PES literature on “the issue of

distribution” (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002, 61).

Rather than discussing distributional

outcomes, the focus was on aggregate outcomes with the aim to “do no harm” to the poor.
The following section of this thesis expands the discussion on the varied positions on the
trade-off between economic efficiency and equity is broadened.

2.5

Trading Equity for Efficiency

Payment

for

ecosystem

services

programs

are

implemented

using

varied

institutional/program models (Appendix A), however, they share similar design elements which
allow for analysis of models. This thesis’ area of interest is the analysis of the program structure
of a Government -financed and User-financed program’s in their ability to deliver environmental
effectiveness, cost-efficiency, and equity.

2.5.1 Existing Research
The literature on PES rarely, until the most recent works, rarely integrated the three critical
policy outcomes of PES: environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and equity (Jack, Kousky
and Sims 2007). Historically, the general focus has been on environmental effectiveness and costeffectiveness as direct policy outcomes. Research based on the Coasean approach to PES
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invariably approaches equity as a side objective that negatively affects the cost-effectiveness and
environmental effectiveness of the PES program (Engel, Pagiola and Wunder 2008, Engel, Pagiola
and Wunder 2008, Wunder and Alban 2008, Pattanayak, Wunder and Ferraro 2010). Wunder
(2013) expounds on this theory and aligns equity as a side objective in Government-financed PES
programs, asserting that User-financed PES programs are better able to be effective in meeting the
PES goal. Government financed PES programs are determined to be “politically adrift into winwin spheres of multiple side-objectives, such as poverty alleviation, regional development, or
electoral motives” (Wunder, 2013, 45).
There is a small, but growing discussion, on equity as critical to PES success (Leimona,
Joshi and van Noordwijk 2007) in line with “Muradian” refocusing of PES. Pascual, Muradian,
Rodriguez and Duraiappah (2009) advances the argument beyond the inclusion of equity, to the
interdependency of cost effectiveness, and equity and its effect on PES (Martin, Gross-Camp,
Kebede and McGuire 2014, Pascual, Muradian, Rodriguez and Duraiappah 2009). The theory
underpinning the link is that perceived inequities in PES programs may lead to inefficiency that
“undermine cooperative behavior and foster conflictive behavior” (Martin, Gross-Camp, Kebede
and McGuire, 2014, 224;Fripp, 2014, 24).
Wunder, Engel and Pagiola (2008) have produced the most significant body of work in the
analysis of PES design focus on the management structure, i.e., Government-financed versus Userfinanced. The comparative analysis is based on the “synthesis” of 12 case studies of PES in
developed and developing countries (Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, 2008, 3).
Case studies reviewed include Wunder and Alban (2008) which examined two Usermanaged PES programs in Ecuador the Pimampiro program - watershed protection and the
PROFAFOR program - carbon sequestration. The findings of the case study of the two User-
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managed programs indicated successful outcomes in achieving the “environmental objectives”
including additionality, negligible leakage and meeting conditionality (Wunder and Alban, 2008,
696). Equity/fairness including poverty alleviation and other pro-poor initiatives are presented as
“side objectives” (Wunder and Alban, 2008, 696).
The findings of the comparative analysis as it relates to equity/fairness follows the criticism
that the Coasean approach looks at aggregate net gain and loss and not distributional outcomes
(Pascual, Muradian, Rodriguez and Duraiappah 2009).

2.6

Limitations and Research Questions

The existing theory is that a User-financed PES program is better programmatically
structured to be effective in meeting the PES goals than a Government-financed program.
However, the existing theory is based largely on research which is limited to analyzing only
effectiveness and efficiency outcomes without equal and comprehensive consideration given to
equity. The argument put forward to not include equity consideration in the design of a PES
program is that this can lead to a distortion or introduction of “side objectives” in the purpose of
the PES (Wunder, 2008, 2; Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, 2008, 90). There has been growing
research focusing on the inclusion of equity in the design of PES including linking equity and
efficiency as interdependent outcomes, the impact of PES program on poor communities and
landowners and measuring the distributional outcomes of PES6.
The purpose of this thesis is to use two case studies to investigate whether the program
structure of a PES program determines its environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and

6

Equity/fairness is often referred to as pro-poor, poverty alleviation, poverty reduction and equal participation.
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equity, and whether or not a PES program can be environmentally effective and cost effective and
still be equitable.
Thus, the following inquiry will be made.
1. How does the program structure of a user-financed PES program differ from a
Government-financed program in cost effectiveness, environmentally effectiveness, and
equity?
2. Does the program structure or institutional design of payment for ecosystem services
determine whether equity/fairness is planned for in the design of PES program?
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Chapter 3
Methodology
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the program structure of a user-financed and a
Government-financed PES program in achieving environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness,
and equity. The case study design is used in this qualitative research. A case study is:
an empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon, set within its real-world
context—especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not
clearly evident (Yin, 2014, 16).
Further, a qualitative case study design was used to present the research. A qualitative case
study is defined as “an intensive, holistic description and analysis of a bounded phenomenon such
as a program, an institution, a person, a group or policy” (Merriam,1998, xii).
The qualitative case study design was the most appropriate research design as the study
was done on the phenomenon in its natural setting without any intervention. Secondly, the
qualitative case study method allowed for the collection of data from “multiple sources of
evidence” (Yin, 2009,117), allowing for triangulation of data collected as well as reducing biases
from informants, authors and myself as the researcher (Yin 2009). Thirdly, qualitative research
advances the collection of descriptive data wherein the thesis focus area requires a detailed
description to thoroughly understand the components of the cases being studied. Lastly, the
qualitative case study design is appropriate as the cases being investigated through the case study
design are “well-bounded and specific”, i.e. there are clear limits to the cases being studied and
the data being collected (Stake, 2005, 443; Merriam,1998,27).
Using a multiple-case design, two contrasting cases: Costa Rica National Program, a
Government-financed for PES program and Los Negros Valley, Bolivia’s User-financed PES
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program are investigated. The multiple case design allows for studying the phenomenon using
more than one case, fitting the scope of this thesis which focuses on two distinct program structure
types implementing PES programs. One of the key advantages to using multiple cases versus using
a single case study is that multiple case study allows for supporting the claim of “literal or
theoretical replication” (Rowley,2002,21; Yin, 2009, 54). A literal replication refers to the
“prediction of similar results” (Rowley,2002,21; Yin, 2009, 54) and a theoretical replication
indicates “the prediction of contrasting results” (Rowley, 2002, 21; Yin, 2009, 54) with expected
reasons for the differences.
Stake (1995) indicates that the pursuit of research through case study are underpinned by
different end goals for researchers. Similarly, to Yin (2009), Stake (1995) notes the use of a
multiple cases in research which he refers to as collective case study. A collective case study may
include cases that are “similar or dissimilar” (Stake,1995,237). Further, the collective/multiple
case study defined as being instrumental as it provides for an in-depth understanding of “an issue
or refinement of a theory” (Stake, 1995, 237). The cases being studied are both similar in that
they are PES programs and dissimilar as the buyers of the ecosystem services are not the Users in
the Government-financed program, contrasting with that of the User-finance structure.
The case study design has been criticized for being weak in the ability to establish external
validity (Falk and Guenther 2006). As Yin (2003) indicates, conducting a multiple case study is
advantageous as it increases the external validity or generalization of the research. A caveat,
however, is that multiple case studies do not create statistical generalization, i.e., generalization to
the whole population, rather, case studies produce analytical generalization which is a
generalization of existing, expanding and generating theories (Yin 2009).
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3.0

Case Study

Two case studies were purposively selected for the research (Patton, 1990, 169) based on
their program structure: (1) Government-financed PES - Costa Rica’s National PES, and (2) Userfinanced PES – Bolivia. Purposeful sampling lends to the inclusion of cases that will provide
comprehensive information on the phenomenon being studied. Various sampling strategies can
be employed in purposeful sampling. The strategy implemented for Costa Rica’s PES program
is a typical case sampling providing an “illustrative sample” (Patton, 1990, 173). In the selection
of the Los Negros Valley, Bolivia’s PES program, intensity sampling was used (Patton, 1990,
171). In intensity sampling, the cases are “excellent or rich examples of the phenomenon of
interest” (Patton, 1990, 171).
The selection of the cases was based on (1) location (Latin America), (2) established ≥10
years, and (3) program structure. Latin America was chosen as the site for the cases as the region
is of critical importance to the provision of global ecosystem services and reducing Climate
Change due to the high biodiversity in the region. The region also has high poverty rates and
dependency on natural resources which creates a flash point for resource use and the
implementation of conservation strategies. In addition, PES has increasingly become a policy tool
in Latin America to protect the provision of ecosystem services.
Costa Rica PES program is the longest running Government-financed program and has
been well-documented and promoted as a model (in most part due to its longevity) for other
countries to follow for a national level payment for ecosystem services program. However, as
noted in the literature research section, there is limited studies in researching the outcomes of
environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and equity in Costa Rica’s PES program or any
other PES program. Los Negros Valley, Bolivia is a far lesser documented PES program, but
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provides a strong case for User-financed PES program. The reward system for the PES program
is a direct result of negotiations between ecosystem services providers and downstream Users
facilitated by an intermediary.
Using the cases of Costa Rica and Los Negros is appropriate to develop analytical
generalization, in this case generalization by expanding on an existing theory.
3.1 Data Collection Methods

Data was proposed to be collected through a focused interview and document analysis.
Primary documents analyzed for the Costa Rica case study were retrieved from links provided by
Fondo Nacional de Financimiento Forestal - FONAFIFO (The National Forestry Fund) found at
www.fonafiffo.go.cr and include legislation (decrees), financial and modality statistics. For the
Los Negros, Bolivia case study the document: Fundación Natura Bolivia: Achievements to Date
and Scale Up Plans shared by Fundación Natura Bolivia was used.

Other documentation was

then used to verify data found in the informants’ documentation. Multiple sources of data
collection support triangulation and increases internal validity and reliability of the research
findings (Yin 2009, Stake 2010, Yazan 2015). Data triangulation is defined as using multiple
source points to reach to a sort of “convergence of enquiry” (Yin,2009,115) to confirm or expand
the researcher’s understanding of the data collected (Stake 2010).
The primary sources of data collection employed for this research was a questionnaire that
was to be followed by a focused interview and document analysis. A focused interview’s main
purpose is “to corroborate information that you already know” (Yin, 2009,107). The data
collection procedure created for the questionnaire and interview was to firstly forward the
questionnaire to the informant and then follow-up with an interview via Skype. However, during
the course of scheduling a Skype call, the informant chose to fill in the questionnaire outside of
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the interview and forwarded the completed questionnaire.

The second informant chose to not

conduct the interview but forwarded documentation based on the questions in the questionnaire
and fielded additional questions and clarifications through email. Both provided links to data on
their organizational website which provided additional data.
The most appropriate corrective action that could have been implemented to address the
non-participation in the questionnaire/interview process would be to select another case. However,
time constraints and lack of another appropriate case selection did not allow for choosing another
case. Two other cases in Ecuador had been selected as options 1 and 2 for the case study.
However, an earthquake resulted in an informant from option 1 withdrawing from being a part of
the research and option 2 was non-responsive.
As noted on the questionnaire (See Appendix B: Questionnaire), some of the data on the
cases are widely and readily available through documentation. However, corroboration was
required to ensure the data was up to date.
For the questionnaire, a mix of both open-ended and closed-ended questions were used.
Closed-ended questions allowed for the collection of factual data such as a number of persons
participating in the payment for ecosystems services. Open-ended questions were included to
allow the free flow of discussion that may have provided additional insights. The questionnaire
was standard for both case studies. Due to the predominant language used in the targeted region
for the cases, the questionnaires were presented in both English and Spanish. The questionnaire
was built based on Jack, Kousky and Sims (2008) which provides a blue-print for best practices
for environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and equity.
Documentation provides “broad coverage” (Yin, 2009,103), but bias can be created based
on (1) the researchers’/authors’ biases and (2) my own selective bias (Yin 2009). To decrease
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biases, primarily, documentation was accessed from the questionnaire responses and data sharing,
and secondarily through an exhaustive review of available documentation on (1) PES design, (2)
PES program case studies and (3) outcomes being analyzed.
Informants used for the case studies were Fundación Natura Bolivia and The National
Forestry Fund (Fondo Nacional de Financimiento Forestal - FONAFIFO).
3.2 Data Analysis

Coding
The coding process was performed manually using descriptive coding (Saldana 2009) for
questionnaire and email question responses. Using the manual process was suitable due to the
small amount of data that was being coded. The questions had predefined codes which were
synthesized to ensure they were mutually exclusive (Saldana 2009). Synthesizing the codes
resulting in 3 categories and 9 sub-categories as presented in Table 2. Codes used were verified
to be mutually exclusive (Saldana 2009). The definition for the categories and sub-categories
was guided by Camhi (2012) and Jack, Kousky and Sims (2008), and are discussed further in
the Findings section.

Table 1: Categories and sub-categories of the coding process

Categories
Environmental Effectiveness

Cost Effectiveness
Equity

Sub-Categories
Policy/Institutional Framework
Monitoring
Compliance and Enforcement
Sustainability of the Provision of Ecosystem
Services
Sustainability of Program
Payment structure
Property Rights Requirements
Distribution
Social Legitimacy
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An example of the coding process is demonstrated below. The example used highlights
that a question with predefined codes can elicit additional content that may fit predefined codes or
emerging codes (Saldana 2009). In the discussed example, the content fits predefined codes as
explained below.
Interview Question: Is there any [intentional targeting of the poor] in the RWA?
Code: social and economic data used for targeting
Interview Response: 1[No], we target poor communities in Bolivia, but the 2[critical criteria for
whether a farmer is eligible for voluntary participation is does the person have a piece of land
that provides an environmental service].
1

Category: Equity
Sub-category: Distribution
Code: Socio-economic data not used for targeting

2

Category: Environmental effectiveness
Sub-category: Sustainability of the Provision of Ecosystem Services
Code: targeted approach

Analyzing Categories
The categories and sub-categories created in the coding process as presented in Table 2
were used in the analysis. Seventeen indicators were developed to identify the presence of each
sub-category. If an indicator was determined as present, a ‘Yes’ was marked to that indicator. The
‘Yes’ was then assigned a score of 1. If an indicator was not determined as present, a ‘No’ was
marked to that indicator. The ‘No’ was then assigned a score of 0.
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By summing up the 1s and 0s from each sub-category, a numerical value was determined
for each category. A 9 point interval scale, demonstrated in Table 2, was used to produce a
subjective determination of the level at which each case study achieved the individual category.

Table 2: 9-point scale for individual categories

SCALE
0
Not indicated

1 to 3
Low

4 to 6
Medium

7 to 9
High

Weights were then added to raw scores of specific sub-categories of the environmental
effectiveness and equity categories. The addition of weights was used to increase the importance
of specific sub-categories and compare those weighted scores for the user-financed case study and
the Government-financed case study.
The cost-effectiveness category was analyzed differently from the other two categories.
One sub-category was assessed under the cost effectiveness category, i.e., payment structure. In
addition to the payment structure sub-category, indicators from the environmental effectiveness
and equity categories were used as variables to assess the two case studies level of achieving cost
effectiveness. Not all indicators were used; only indicators associated with bearing costs were
used.
A table was created to assign selected indicators as either bearing high transaction costs or
low transaction costs. The results from the payment structure category were included in the table
as well. Indicators are appropriate to use as they “reflect changes in a particular context” (Church
and Rogers,1996,44).
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3.3 Protection of Human Subjects
The questionnaire was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
through an expedited Review Procedure as it qualified as no more than minimal risk to human
subjects.
Informants were forwarded a consent form (See Appendix C: Consent Form) and asked to
indicate acceptance via email prior to the questionnaire being sent to them. The consent form
informed them about (1) the scope, (2) risks and benefits, (3) confidentiality, (4) voluntary nature
of their participation and (4) contact information for any questions or concerns about the
questionnaire or overall research.
3.3 Limitations

Major limitations are noted in conducting the case study. Firstly, my inability to conduct
in-person interviews with informants due to lack of resources made it challenging to lock-in
informants to an interview schedule. The data collection methodology in the data collection
procedure was amended to ensure that data would be received from the individual case informants.
Amending the data collection decreased the robustness of the case study.
Conducting a multiple case study is time-consuming and can be expensive, however, the
more cases within a multiple case study, the stronger the replication logic (literal or theoretical)
(Yin 2009). While, this thesis includes two distinct program structure to investigate units of
observation of Payment for Ecosystem Services program, the inclusion of additional cases under
the individual program structures would increase the replication logic of the study. Due to
accessibility to data on additional cases and time constraints, additional cases could not be
included.
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Lastly, the use of indicators to determine the presence of the three policy outcomes may
affect the validity and reliability of the study (Patton, 1996, 159).

There are no existing

standardized indicators of PES evaluation. I attempt to establish indicators based on exhaustive
research of literature on payment for ecosystem services.
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Chapter 4
Findings
Chapter 4 describes the findings of the data collected for the case studies. Table 3 provides
a summary of the results for the categories of environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and
equity.
The Costa Rica PES indicated that the program structure enabled the program to have high
environmental effectiveness and equity outcomes. For the Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal
Water Agreements Program (RWA) indicated the program structure enabled a medium level of
environmental effectiveness, but a high level of equity outcomes (Table 3). The Governmentfinanced program had a greater number of low transaction cost elements than high transaction cost
elements indicating that the program structure is somewhat cost-effective. For the User-financed
PES program, the high transaction cost elements were greater than the low transaction cost
elements indicating a program structure that is less cost-effective than the Government-financed
PES program (Table 4).

Table 3: Summary of Findings for Environmental Effectiveness and Equity - Costa Rica National PES
and Los Negros Valley, Bolivia

Categories
Environmental Effectiveness

Equity

Country
Costa Rica

7

7

Bolivia

4

7

Range
0 = not present

low 1 - 3

Medium 4 – 6
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High 7 – 9

Table 4: Summary of Findings for Cost Effectiveness - Costa Rica National PES and Los Negros Valley, Bolivia

High Transaction
Costs
Elements

Low Transaction Cost
Elements
Costa Rica

4

2

Los Negros Valley,
Bolivia

2

3

4.0 Case Study Context

4.0.1 Government-financed Payment for Ecosystem Services - Costa Rica National Payment
for Ecosystem Services Program
Costa Rica is situated in Central America and has forests of high biological diversity
value (Committee on Noneconomic and Economic Value of Biodiversity and Commission on Life
Sciences, 1999). A system of national parks has been established to protect the country’s diversity.
However, during the period 1970 – the early 80’s, the country’s high biodiversity was being overexploited by cattle ranching and agriculture, resulting in high deforestation. Agriculture, logging,
cattle ranching and related commercial activities were being supported by Government policies
which allowed for subsidies and loans directed at these industries. The result was forest cover
decreasing to 20% from a high of 70% (Porras, Barton, Chacón-Cascante and Miranda, 2013,5).
In 1997, Costa Rica’s National Payment for Ecosystem Services program (7Pago por
Servicios Ambientales – PSA) program was implemented as one of the policy responses to
significant deforestation.

Forestry Law No. 7575 of 1996, the legal framework for PES, was

enacted allowing for the implementation of payment for ecosystem services in Costa Rica, marking

7

The literal English translation is Payment for Environmental Services, however to remain consistent with the
document the term Ecosystem is used.
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the first national PES program. The law prescribes for contracting land enrollment for the
provision of four ecosystem services:
•

Carbon sequestration

•

Watershed protection

•

Biodiversity protection

•

Scenic beauty
The ecosystem services are sold as a bundle. PES implementation was perceived as a more

cooperative compliment to protected areas. According to Vatn (2010), the progression for PES in
Costa Rica is normative as PES programs are implemented within an existing institutional
framework. The Costa Rica PES program has a total of 340,432.99 hectares contracted under the
payment for ecosystem services program. Land under PES is spread across the country’s 7
provinces (Figure 6).

Five thousand and eighty-one (5,081) contracts are currently within the

program. The provinces of Puntarena and Limon have the largest hectares contracted under PES
with 76,971.12 and 66,858.82 hectares respectively, while the province of Guanacaste has the
largest number of PES contracts with 1,259.
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Figure 5: Contracts and hectares under PES per provinces. Source: FONAFIFO, 2016

The PES Program has a total of 68 thematic areas: (1) forest protection, (2) reforestation,
(3) agroforestry system, (4) forest management based on pre-determined conservation area, (5)
natural forest regeneration and (6) existing forest plantations.
According to FONAFIFO, the “National Forestry Development Plan goal is to maintain
land under PES in the low 300 thousand hectares” (email questionnaire response, FONAFIFO,
May 4, 2016).

8

Each thematic area has 17 modalities: (1) forest protection, (2) water resource protection, (3) forest protection in conservation
gaps, (4) protection within protected areas, (6) afforestation, (7) reforestation with native species endangered, (8) reforestation
protection areas, (9) Second Harvests – management of existing forest plantation, (10) natural generation for Clean Development
Mechanism, (11) natural regeneration, (12) natural regeneration of forests productive potential, (13) agroforestry systems, (14)
agroforestry for coffee production, (15) agroforestry systems for endangered species of trees, (16) agroforestry systems for native
species and (17) forest management. www.fonaifo.go.cr/psa
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The PES program was designed through participatory consultation with various sectors
including the forest and tourism sectors, indigenous people, Ministry of the Environment and
Energy (MINAE), National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC) and National Forestry Office
(ONF) and continues to be revised. Costa Rica’s PES Program is administered by The National
Forestry Fund (Fondo Nacional de Financimiento Forestal - FONAFIFO), which falls within the
Ministry of the Environment and Energy, a Government entity. FONAFIFO has established eight
regional offices to serve PSA participants.

4.0.2

User-Financed Payment for Ecosystem Services - Los Negros Valley, Bolivia

PES/Reciprocal Watershed Agreement
The Los Negros Valley is located in the Department of Santa Cruz in Bolivia, South
America. Bolivia has high biodiversity, particularly its cloud forests which is home to endemic
bird species, however, these forests are at high risk for deforestation and forest degradation. For
the indigenous Andean communities surrounding the Los Negros Watershed, these cloud forests
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Figure 6: PES conservation areas in the Los Negros Valley.
Source: Asquith, Vargas and Wunder, 2007

are a source of clean drinking water. In the Andean culture, water is held “as a universal and
communal right” and its distribution should be equal based on the “needs, traditions and
community norms that respect the water cycle.” Further, water is seen as free (common good) and
should not be sold.
In 2003, the downstream community of Santa Cruz was at a crisis point after a long
drought and low water flow and quantity, which made irrigation for crops challenging. The
downstream users held the upstream farmers responsible for the changes to the water quantity and
quality due to the clearing of riparian forests within the watershed. The non-Governmental
organization, Fundación Natura Bolivia (Nature Foundation) assisted in the formation of a
community-based PES program to protect the Los Negros Watershed. With funding from the US
Fish and Wildlife Foundation, Fundación Natura Bolivia facilitated 6 downstream irrigators and
upstream farmers to negotiate contracts to preserve cloud forests and protect their livelihoods. In
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exchange for every 10 hectares of forest not deforested, upstream landowners receive nonmonetary rewards in a beehive, apiculture training and barbed wire for compliance.
An evolution of the initial PES program has resulted in the program being formally titled
as Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (Acuerdos Recíprocos por Agua – ARA). Fundación Natura
Bolivia asserts that the term “payment” should not be used in non-monetary schemes and promotes
RWA as an “alternative to PES” (Asquith 2014). The purpose of the Reciprocal Watershed
Agreements (RWA) is to protect the water supply through the protection of upstream forests and
creating an enabling environment for downstream water users to contribute to such forest
protection (Fundación Natura Bolivia). Currently, 95 farmers are enrolled to protect 4,500
hectares of forests.

4.1

Findings for Environmental Effectiveness Category
Environmental effectiveness is defined as the degree to which the contracted provision of

ecosystem services is achieved (Porras, Barton, Chacón-Cascante and Miranda, 2013,5). There
are five sub-categories used in this study to indicate environmental effectiveness in PES: (1) policy
context/institutional framework, (2) monitoring, (3) compliance and enforcement, (4)
sustainability of the provision of ecosystem services and, (5) sustainability of the program.
The Costa Rica PES program scored a 7 for environmental effectiveness which is
considered as a high level for environmental effectiveness based on the 9- point scale. Los Negros
Valley RWA scored a 4 which indicates a medium level of environmental effectiveness. The
environmental effectiveness category is further discussed supported by results from the subcategories and indicators which contributed to the final score.
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Table 5: Summary Findings for Environmental Effectiveness Category

Sub-Category

Environmental
Effectiveness

Compliance
Policy/Institutional
and
Monitoring
Framework
Enforcement
Country
Costa
Rica
Los
Negros

2

2

1

1

1

7

1

1

1

1

0

4

Not
indicated = 0

4.1.1

Sustainability
of the
Sustainability Total
Provision of
of Program Score
the
Ecosystem
Services

Low = 1 -3

Medium =
4-6

High =
7-9

Policy Context/Institutional Framework
Two indicators were used in the policy context/institutional framework sub-category:
a) Legislative legitimacy - refers to the establishment of the PES by legislation, decree,
and other legal mechanisms giving authority for the management structure and other
guiding principles for the PES.
b) Political support – refers to tangible buy-in, recognition and support from decisionmakers for the PES at the formal political level, e.g. national and local Governments.

Table 6: Findings for Policy Context/Institutional Framework Category

Policy and
Institutional
Framework

Country
Costa Rica
Los Negros, Bolivia

Political Support
1
1
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Indicators
Legal Legitimacy
1
0

a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (Score: 2)
Costa Rica’s PES Program has legal legitimacy through the enactment of Forestry Law No.
7575 of 1996. Forestry Law No. 7575 provides for the establishment of PES as a policy tool and
for the institutional framework to operationalize the policy. The National Forestry Fund
(FONAFIFO) is the implementing agency for the PES program. FONAFIFO is a component of
the Ministry of the Environment and Energy (MINAE), a Government entity headed by a Minister
of Government. The placement of the implementing agency for PES within a Government
Ministry is critical to the long-term viability of the PES program and provides strong political
support for the national PES program.
Amendments, through legal decrees, have been made to the legislation to address gaps and
make the program more effective.

A historical review of the PES program informs that

amendments have included new modalities and a targeted approach that recognizes: (1)
“heterogeneity in land productivity” (Alix-Garcia, de Janvry and Sadouletand, 2008), (2) the risk
of deforestation, (3) the conservation value of land, and (4) poor landowners and non-traditional
land possession.
b)

Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score: 1)
Los Negros Valley RWA is local in scope and is not directly supported by national or

local legislation9. Funds for purchasing the program rewards (beehive, apicultural training, and
barbwire fencing) for participants in the RWA is disbursed through the Municipal Government.
The inclusion of a Government entity as an integral actor in the disbursement process indicates

9

Scaling up of RWA is occurring across Bolivia amassing 36 municipalities implementing the program as well as in
neighboring countries. However, the research area being investigated is singular and specific to Los Negros Valley,
therefore the reference to the RWA being local in scope.
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that the Los Negros Valley RWA has significant political support, specifically at the Municipal
Government level.
Municipal Governments have been given legislative power over natural resources
management through the Law of Popular Participation 1581 of 1994 also known as the
decentralization law. The legislation also formalized the relationship between civil society and
the Government of Bolivia (Seemann 2004). Indirectly, the Law of Popular Participation gives a
degree of legal legitimacy to the Los Negros RWA giving legal recognition of the role of civil
society in resources management in Bolivia. However, there is no legislation dedicated to the
operationalization of RWA in Bolivia.
Further, Fundación Natura Bolivia

(10Nature Foundation of Bolivia) as a non-

Governmental (non-profit) organization has acted as a facilitator for the program and has received
international donor funding for the start-up costs and operations. The ability to attract funding and
to operationalize the program, shows de facto legal legitimacy of the RWA program, however, this
is the extent of any legal backing for the Los Negros RWA.
The lack of a legal framework for the Los Negros RWA is Bolivia’s unstable political
environment and disjointed environmental policy context may have a direct influence on the nonexistent enabling legal environment for RWA in Los Negros.
4.1.2

Monitoring

The monitoring category has two indicators:
a) Baseline: refers to the systematic collection of bio-physical data to establish the flow of
ecosystem services against which any changes to ecosystems post-PES intervention can be
measured.

10

Nature Foundation of Bolivia role is also comparative to that of an intermediary as discussed in the equity variable.
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b) Monitoring for the provision of ecosystem services: refers to a planned monitoring program
to ensure participants are providing ecosystem services in accordance with the PES
contract.
A counter-factual baseline is critical to determining whether or not a PES program is
working in obtaining additionality, i.e. the provision of ecosystem services that would not occur
without PES. The counter-factual baseline hypothesizes a scenario without and with PES (Wunder,
Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services in Tropical Conservation 2007) feeding into
the design and monitoring of the PES. Without the establishment of counterfactual baseline, the
evaluation of the real impact of PES is weak and can negatively affect environmental and costeffectiveness.

Table 7: Findings for Monitoring Category

Indicators

Monitoring

Counter-factual baseline
established
Country
Costa Rica
Los Negros, Bolivia

0
0

Monitoring f/
provision
of ecosystem
services
1
1

a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score: 1)
The baseline for the PES program was established in 1997 using Landsat imagery of forest
cover. In the early stages of the PES program, a “static baseline” (Wunder, Efficiency of Payments
for Environmental Services in Tropical Conservation 2007) was used where payment was being
made for forest-cover without the determination of whether forest protection would occur without
PES. Enrollment in the program was first-come, first accepted to match several criteria. The
evolution of the Costa Rica Program has resulted in more targeted approach through establishing
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national priorities for the selection of land to be enrolled in the program such as land to fill
conservation of biodiversity gaps, land within biological corridors and land within critical
watersheds. As noted in the Policy and Institutional Framework section, a targeted PES program
increases the environmental cost-effectiveness of the program.
b) Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:1)
One known baseline data collection was done through Landsat imagery in 2001, similarly
as was done in the Costa Rica Program. The image captured land use types for Los Negros. No
hydrological baseline studies were conducted and the information used to initiate the program in
2003 was based on associating low water levels with upland deforestation.
Monitoring for ecosystem services provision is conducted in both programs through field
visits to farms enrolled under PES as well as geospatial technology to track and monitor the PES
Program. As discussed in the Compliance and Enforcement section, both programs use proxies to
assess additionality - provision of ecosystem services. Proxies are contracted actions or nonactions, e.g. not cutting a certain hectare of forests or planting a specified number of trees, with
the end goal being the additional provision of ecosystem services.
Monitoring is critical to ensuring adherence to the contract, and ostensibly the actual
provision of ecosystem services, thus improving environmental effectiveness as well as building
trust between seller and buyer. As one of the downstream irrigators in Santa Cruz said:
For us, it is very important that we have an environmental committee to monitor if
they are really looking after the watershed or not. (RARE, Watershed Protection in
Bolivia: Reciprocal Water Agreements 2010)
Costs associated with monitoring can be considered high transaction cost or a low
transaction cost. An untargeted PES will require more monitoring, increasing cost (high-cost
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transaction). Contrastingly, a targeted PES can allow for a tailored monitoring program and reduce
costs.

4.1.3

Compliance and Enforcement
PES has two models for payments: output based and input based payments. Output-based

payments require direct measurement of additional provision of ecosystem services. Carbon
sequestration is the only ecosystem services for which output based payments have been made.
Input based or proxy based payments reward land owners for land-use behaviors such as not
clearing forests, planting a number of trees etc. or outcomes from these actions such as increased
forest cover. The theoretical underpinning is that these activities should provide ecosystem
services as the opposite action degrades or causes loss to ecosystem services. Using proxies can
be effective if a strong causal relationship can be ascertained between the proxy and the expected
provision of ecosystem services (Jack, Kousky and Sims 2008).
Appropriate proxies contribute to the environmental effectiveness and cost effectiveness
by improving the opportunity to secure additional ecosystems services. A direct relationship
between the PES intervention and changes to ecosystems services can be better established.
The compliance and enforcement sub-category has three indicators:
a) Payment based on output based performance: refers to payment based on the measured
provision of ecosystem services (additionality). For example, carbon sequestration can be
calculated by the number of tress, types of species, age of trees etc.
b) Payment based on appropriate proxies: refers to payment based on actions such as the
number of trees planted, hectares not deforested etc. and associates the input with changes
to the ecosystem services targeted. “Appropriate proxies” relates to the certainty between
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proxies and the provision of ecosystem services desired (Jack, Kousky and Sims 2008,
9467).
c) Enforcement of contract: refers to the administration of the contract signed through
enrollment and the imposition of sanctions when the terms of the contract are violated.

Table 8: Findings for Compliance and Enforcement Sub-category

Indicators
Compliance and Country
Enforcement
Costa Rica
Bolivia

a)

Payment based on
provision of ecosystem
services
0
0

Payment based on
appropriate proxies
1
0

Enforcement of
Contract
1
1

Costa Rica’s National PES program (score: 2)
Payment for land enrolled under PES is input based versus output-based. The Costa Rica

PES program contracts land under PES based on priority areas with identified conservation values.
An Executive Decree is issued indicating the priority modalities, the maximum hectares for each
modality and the priority land-use types. Costa Rica’s PES program uses a targeted approach to
PES participation which improves the certainty of the proxy.
FONAFIFO explained the enforcement of the PES contract:
All conditions of the contract are enforced and the contract compliance rate is 98%.
Enforcement is through the control and scheduled payments, in addition to [the use of]
all applicable legislation.
Sanctions may include the termination of contract and repayment of funds paid to seller
and removal from the PES program.
b)

Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:1)
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The Los Negros Valley, Bolivia RWA is also input based. Enrollment of farmers into the
RWA is dependent on the ability of their land to provide the desired ecosystem services. The
process to determine the ecosystem services provision is untargeted as all farmers in the upstream
area (Santa Cruz) are invited to enroll. Accepted lands are mapped after which a conservation area
is set aside as land under PES. The untargeted approach decreases the certainty of the proxy.
The conditions of the contract are enforced. Sanctions for non-compliance include the
return of the incentive or its value in cash.

4.1.4

Sustainability of the Provision of Ecosystem Services
Reforestation can take between 50 – 100 years. Using a minimum realistic timeframe for

the growth of secondary forests into shrubs (Food and Agriculture Organization), a contract period
of not less than 5 years was assigned for the indicator of Sustainability of the Provision of
Ecosystem Services.
The sustainability of the provision of ecosystem services has one indicator:
a) Contract term < 5 years: refers to the timeframe which the landowner has agreed to have
their land under PES being greater than 5 years.

Table 9: Findings for Sustainability of Provision of Ecosystem Services Category

Indicators
Contract term < 5 yrs

Country
Sustainability of the Provision
of Ecosystem Services

Costa Rica

1

Bolivia

1
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a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:1)
Contracts terms are formulated by FONAFIFO and published in the La Gaceta, the Official
Gazette (a publication which forms part of the legal requirement for public notification). Contracts
are differentiated based on the modality. For the priorities for 2015 which are reforestation and
afforestation contracts, the contract terms are between 5 – 16 years: Reforestation <9; afforestation
10 – 16 years based on tree species; agroforestry and forest management = 5 years.
b) Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score: 1)
The RWA contract term is for a period of 5 years for land in upstream with the option for
renewal.

4.1.5

Sustainability of Program
A PES which does not have long-term financing mechanisms is likely to be

environmentally ineffective due a lack of permanence associated with a disrupted PES
program.
a)

Long-term funding: refers to the availability of funding for the long-term to support the
costs related to the implementation of PES.

Table 10: Findings for Sustainability of Program Sub-category

Indicator
Sustainability of
Program

Long-term
funding

Country
Costa Rica

1

Bolivia

0
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a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:1)
A diverse funding base for the Costa Rica program supports the likelihood of long-term
financing for the continuation of the program. Diversification of the funding base was a result of
evaluation the financial mechanism for PES.
The fuel tax has given a minimum stability to the Programme, but we have been
constantly exploring fresh sources. We quickly realized that as a small country we
were not going to be able to compete under the original Kyoto and Clean Development
Mechanisms, so we looked inside our own country instead (I. Porras 2012).
Funding sources for Costa Rica: 3.5% fuel tax, budget allocation by the State, sale of
greenhouse gases emission credits on international markets, sale of ecosystem services certificates
for businesses donating towards payment for ecosystem services as credit towards conservation,
sale of hydrological services to hydroelectric plants, allocations to the National Forestry Financing
Fund and international donors. According to FONAFIFO:
the bulk of the budget comes from the excise tax on fuels, but [there are] other sources such
as 11water canon, the voluntary carbon markets, some awards or payments for biodiversity and the
tourism sector contributions.
Costa Rica’s PES program appears to be designed to be innovative and diverse in its
funding base to reduce any potential impact of policy cycles associated with Government-financed
PES Programs (Arriagada and Perrings 2009).
b) Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:1)

11

The water canon is tax created to pay small forestry owner in high conservation priority areas. Water Users are
charged the tax based on the purpose of the use of the water and quality use. Executive Decree No. 26635-MINAE
of 18 December 1997
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Downstream water users of Los Negros pay US$.50 as a water tariff. The water tariff is a
component of the PES financial mechanism from which the Santa Cruz upstream farmers are
rewarded for the provision of ecosystem services. Funds collected from the water tariff and other
funding sources are used to purchase in-kind rewards for the upstream which includes beehive and
barb wire, as well as technical training.
International donor funding has also been infused into RWA for implementation. Secure
long-term funding is influenced by the agreements signed between the parties, however, if the
buyer chooses to withdraw from the program, the long-term financial security may be threatened.
One of the primary differences between a user-financed and Government financed PES program
is that in the user-financed program there is direct seller-buyer negotiations and payments. The
Coasean approach to PES states that a buyer/user would only withdraw from a program when the
ecosystem services are no longer being provided (Arriagada and Perrings 2009). Withdrawal of
the buyer from the PES when the services are no longer being provided would be indicative of a
PES structure working as it should.
However, the RWA is not a simple buyer-seller structured user-financed program. In the
Los Negros RWA, the buyers include direct beneficiaries (downstream irrigators) as well as local
Government (municipal government) and indirect global beneficiaries (external funder). The
withdrawal any one funding source could prove detrimental for this PES Program, therefore, it is
considered to not have long-term sustainability.

4.2

Findings for the Equity Category
Equity is defined as the fair distribution of costs and benefits through inclusive

participation and decision-making and recognition of traditional rights, norms, and knowledge.
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There are three sub-categories for the Equity category: (1) property rights requirement, (2)
distribution and, (3) social legitimacy.
a) Property rights requirement: refers to the property rights required for enrollment in the
PES program
b) Distribution: refers to who bear the costs and benefits of the program
c) Social legitimacy: refers to buy-in and support at the community level for the PES program.

Table 11: Summary of Equity Category Findings
Sub-categories

Equity

Country
Costa
Rica
Los
Negros

Property Rights
Requirement

No present
indicated = 0

4.2.1

Distribution

Social
Legitimacy

Total Score

2

2

1

5

2

1

1

4

Low = 1 -3

Medium =
4-6

High =
7-9

Property Rights
PES requires well-defined property rights to secure the provision of services. Requiring

property rights can preclude the poorest from participating in PES programs (Vatn 2010, 1248)
and is indicative of the inherent inequity of PES.
The property rights sub-category has three indicators:
a) Land title: refers to formalized land ownership recognized and registered in the
Government cadastral system.
b) Traditional land management: refers to recognized traditional land ownership such as
communal lands.

51

c) Alternative land possession: refers to the recognition of land without formalize ownership
such as land squatting.
Table 12: Findings for Property Rights Requirement Sub-category

Indicators

Land title
Property Rights
Requirement

Country

Traditional/
Customary
land
management

Alternative
possession
rights

Costa Rica

1

1

0

Bolivia

1

0

1

a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:2)
As part of the enrollment process, a land owner interested in participating in the PES
program must submit a land title or other ownership documents. The land title is verified with
FONAFIFO’s cadastral system for authenticity.
The land title requirement does not apply to indigenous groups who use traditional land
management, i.e. communal land management. Communal lands are formally recognized by
Costa Rica’s National Land System. The acceptance of communal land in the PES system is not
a direct equity strategy from within the PES program, but a by-product of national equity and
human rights policy actions that contributes to equity in the PES program.
b) Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:2)
Traditional land ownership (titling) in the rural areas of Bolivia is an anomaly rather than
the norm. Land ownership is complex with few farmers possessing Government issued titles with
most landowners possess generational purchase agreements. In addition, the rural areas are
populated by indigenous groups who use communal land management.
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The RWA has a major challenge with landless immigrants, referred to as colonists, who
squat on private land not fenced (demonstrating ownership) or land within conservation areas
(Asquith, Vargas and Wunder 2008). As these immigrants do not possess the elusive Government
issued titles or the generational ownership through purchase contracts, they are not included in the
RWA. However, the landless immigrants have an effect on the RWA as they deforest in critical
forest areas (Asquith, Vargas and Wunder 2008).

4.2.2

Distribution
The distribution category has two indicators:

a) Smaller properties <50 hectares included
b) Socio-economic data used in targeting

Table 13: Findings for the Distribution Sub-Category

Indicators

Distribution

Country
Costa Rica
Bolivia

Smaller
properties
included <50
hectares
1
1

Socioeconomic
data used in
targeting
1
0

a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:2)
The Costa Rica PES program allows the registration of property less than 50 hectares for
inclusion in the PES program. Properties less than 50 hectares that are within identified critical
conservation areas are prioritized as important to include in the PES program. That importance is
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highlighted by assigning 25 additional points for these types of properties in calculating the
optimal properties to achieve the PES goals. The inclusion of smaller properties is indicative of a
PES program’s attempt to include poorer land owners and make the program more equitable.
Central to Costa Rica’s PES program is the integration of environmental protection,
economic development and poverty alleviation in the program design. Notably, in the preamble
of the Executive Decree No. 39083 which declares the priority areas for the period of July 2015,
Costa Rica’s National Development Plan is identified as the overarching guiding principle for
defining priority areas. The Development Plan is built on the principles of social and economic
justice to alleviate poverty.
The focus on poverty alleviation per the Development Plan is indicated in the scoring for
priority areas with criteria such as forests within indigenous communities’ territory awarded 85
points, the highest additional assigned score. Additionally, forest farms in districts with a Social
Development Index (SDI) of less than 43.4% receive 10 additional points. The SDI is used to
target low-income areas that are also within the conservation target areas, however, the Index is
criticized for not fulfilling the objective of inclusion of the poorest in PES (I. Porras 2012).
However, while there are efforts to address equity through creating a targeting approach, there are
program design problems which are critical barriers to the poor entering the PES program as well
as a significant threat to environmental effectiveness as one PES participant explained:
PES has helped us a lot and has given me the opportunity to ensure my economic
future, not one hundred percent, but I am not complaining. The paperwork to obtain
PES is getting more difficult… I don’t know whether I will be eligible in the next
period…if I am not eligible, I will probably start cutting, and SINAC [the
conservation area authority] does not have the capacity to stop us (Barton 2014).
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Intermediaries can be beneficial in assisting participant’s in enrolling in the PES program,
but there are costs associated with the inclusion of intermediaries that not all PES participants are
able to afford.
b) Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (Score:1)
Properties that are 1 hectare and above can be enrolled in the RWA. Los Negros Valley’s
population is mainly poor, indigenous people and landless migrants. Targeting the poor or special
groups is not a part of the RWA as the situational context makes these groups natural participants.
As Fundación Natural Bolivia explained, targeting the poor is not a consideration in enrolling
participants in the program.
No, we target poor communities in Bolivia, but the critical criteria for whether a
farmer is eligible for voluntary participation is does the person have a piece of
land that provides an environmental service.
The landless migrants, discussed in the property rights requirement sub-category, are not
part of the RWA program.

4.2.3

Social Legitimacy
The social legitimacy sub-category has three indicators:

a) Participatory/Consultative Process: refers to the inclusion of critical stakeholders in the
design, implementation and evaluation of PES process
b) Awareness/Education Programs: refers to intentional actions to inform and educate PES
participants and potential participants about PES.
c) Intermediaries: refers to organizations, individuals, etc. who act as the go-between for the
buyers and sellers, negotiating prices and other conditions.
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Table 14: Findings for Social Legitimacy Sub-category

Indicators

Social Legitimacy

Country
Costa Rica
Bolivia

Participatory/
Consultative
Process
1
1

Awareness/
Education
1
1

Intermediaries
1
1

a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:3)
According to FONAFIFO, the Costa Rica National PES program design and evaluation “is
a dynamic process of constant revision, always with the participation of various sectors, producers,
indigenous, MINAE, SINAC, ONF” (Email questionnaire response, FONAFIFO, May 4, 2016).
Using a participatory approach in design and evaluation is likely to create greater acceptance in
the local communities creating social legitimacy. Social legitimacy supports political buy-in as
politicians are more likely to support a program that does not have community resistance.
Both social and political support can be linked to environmental effectiveness with the
former contributing to securing PES land from leakage and in the provision of ecosystem services,
whilst the latter ensures long-term funding. A participatory approach with diverse stakeholders
also provides an enabling environment for building an equitable PES Program.
With amendments to the institutional structure, regional FONAFIFO offices have been
established throughout the country allowing for more direct interaction with PES participants. The
establishment of local offices is a significant change to the program structure that can improve
targeting and monitoring increasing environmental effectiveness and cost effectiveness.
Public awareness and education is continuous, particularly to gain and maintain the trust
of communities to participate in the PES program. Building and maintain trust is critical to the
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success of the PES Program. In the past, landowners, particularly indigenous people, have
expressed concerns that PES was an attempt to take their land rights.
When the PES began, people were confused. They thought that if we sold the air
from the trees, it was a step from there to lose our land (I. Porras 2012)

You should understand that during the last 25 years, under the banner of ‘protecting
the environment’ the authorities have progressively taken our land rights, which
IDA [Land Reform Institute] previously said were ours… so it’s natural that us
locals are angry (Barton 2014).
FONAFIFO has focused on increasing trust and social legitimacy through establishing
local offices, public awareness, and education. Intermediaries also play a critical role in bridging
the information gap between PES and applicants, particularly for the indigenous communities.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), community organizations and farmer
cooperatives act as intermediaries where they negotiate PES contract for a group of landowners
with FONAFIFO. In a now revised program structure, intermediaries would sell the ecosystem
services to FONAFIFO and sign the contract on the behalf of the land owners they represented.
However, FONAFIFO revised the PES program whereby if an intermediary is used, the individuals
the intermediary is representing must sign an individual contract with FONAFIFO.
b) Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:3)
The RWA management approach is highly participatory and consultative amongst the
supporting institution/intermediary, Fundación Natura, the communities of Los Negros and Santa
Cruz, Water Cooperatives and the Municipal Government. A key outcome of the participatory
environment is the in-kind and technical training rewards structure which was specifically chosen
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by the sellers as fulfilling an income-generation need. Trust-building has been a major challenge
for the implementation of RWA. The lack of trust is tied to a general lack of trust in Government
and other authorities based on Bolivia’s history of corruption and marginalization of the poor and
indigenous people.
While there is no formal public awareness campaign in the Los Negros Valley, the trust
building activities with the sellers and buyers have acted as an informal public awareness channel.
Fundación Natura role as a supporting institution for the RWA extends also to the role as
intermediary working with sellers and buyers. The intermediary role is not self-declared by
Fundación Natura.

4.3

Findings: Cost-Effectiveness Category
Cost-effectiveness is defined as the ability of a payment for ecosystem services program to

achieve its environmental goals at the lowest possible cost compared with other strategies (Jack,
Kousky and Sims 2008).
There is one sub-category for the Cost Effectiveness Category in PES - payment structure.
Using the findings from the Environmental Effectiveness and Equity categories and the findings
of the payment structure sub-category, a determination is made on cost effectiveness.
4.3.1

Payment Structure
The payment structure category has two indicators:

a) Differentiated payment: refers to payment structure created to include opportunity costs of
PES participants and the conservation value of the forests being protected. A PES
participant protecting forests in a modality of high conservation value will get a different
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per hectare payment compared to a participant protecting forests in a lesser conservation
value area.
b) Front loaded payment: refers to a payment structure which allows for a large percentage
of funds to be paid upfront, i.e. in the 1st year of the contract. For example, in year 1, a
PES participant may receive 50%, year 2 – 20%, year 3 – 15%, year 4 – 10% and year 5 –
5%.

Table 15: Findings of the Payment Structure Sub-category

Payment
Structure

Indicators
Differentiated Front loaded
Payment
payment

Country
Costa Rica
Bolivia

1
1

1
1

Differentiated payments in PES programs is indicative of targeting based on pre-assigned
conservation values and is considered to be cost effective. Upfront payments help to cover sellers’
costs, especially for poorer participants.
a) Costa Rica’s National PES program (score:2)
Costa Rica’s PES program payment structure was revised from a flat payment structure,
which is considered less cost-effective than a differentiated payment structure. The differentiated
payment structure is based on the modality the land is being enrolled. Differentiated payment has
been introduced for the modalities of: forest protection, agroforestry systems, and reforestation.
The 2015 Call for Participants indicates differentiated payment based on the conservation value of
the land relevant to priority areas for PES (spatial targeting) and the type of species being planted
(reforestation and afforestation modality). Natural Regeneration, forest management, and forest
plantation are on a flat payment structure.
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Front loaded payment is offered for the agroforestry and reforestation modalities with first
payments at 50% in advance. For the reforestation modality, front-loaded payment applies to PES
activities on land 50 hectares or less. The front-loaded payment for landholders with less than 50
hectares is a signal of the PES program having been designed to be inclusive of poorer landholders.
b) Los Negros, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA) (score:1)
A differentiated payment structure is utilized based on the number of hectares (based on a
scale), forest types and use. Payment ranges from US$1.5/hectare to US$3/hectare. Los Negros,
unlike Costa Rica’s PES program, does not pay participants in cash as the reward is through inkind payment or technical assistance.

Cash is used to purchase beehives, barbed-wires, and

technical training, particularly apicultural training.

The reward was negotiated between

sellers/buyers as the best option as one seller noted, “If I receive money, I will spend it quickly,
but honey production has helped me diversify my income” (Fundacion Natura Bolivia 2015)
Approximately 7 days after contract signing, the incentives are provided to the farmer,
therefore, the RWA is considered as offering front-loaded payment.

4.3.2

Analysis of transaction costs
Transaction costs are all the costs involved in implementing the PES program including

implementation costs and opportunity costs on the administrative end and costs for enrollment on
the participants’ end. Opportunity costs for the participants are not included in the transaction
costs.
Table 16 provides an analysis of the transaction costs of each case study. Based on the
exhaustive literature review, design elements of each case study were deemed either as low
transaction cost elements or high transaction cost elements and assign to the appropriate category.
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Table 16: Analysis of transaction costs

Costa Rica

Los Negros
Valley,
Bolivia

Low Transaction Cost
Elements
• differentiated
payments
in some modalities
• payments from
multiple
buyers
consolidated to
provide
payment to the
seller
• targeted approach
• bundling of
services
(4)
• small group of
buyers and sellers
• payments from
multiple buyers
consolidated to
provide payment to
seller
• bundled services

High Transaction Cost
Elements
• many small landholdings
participants
• flat payment

(2)
•
•
•

(3)

untargeted PES
monitoring costs
use of uncertain proxies

(3)

For the Government-financed PES program, the targeting of poorer landholders to improve
equity in the PES program resulted in many small landholders which are considered a high
transaction cost element (Jack, Kousky and Sims 2008, Vatn 2010). Intermediaries can play a
crucial role in reducing transaction costs by being the representative of a group of small
landholders. Costa Rica’s PES program was restructured to not include group participation
(excluding communal landholding), therefore the intermediary acts in a more consultative
capacity. Further, intermediaries are not a constant for cooperatives, etc. as FONAFIFO noted that
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“there are organizations that support some of the owners of farms, but not always” (email response
to questionnaire, FONAFIFO, May 4, 2016).
Flat payment in a PES program is considered to be both environmental and cost ineffective
(Wu Yang, et al. 2013, Engel, Wünscher and Wunder 2007). Firstly, landholders with higher
opportunity costs and higher ecosystem services provision may be deterred from entering the PES
program, while those with lesser opportunity costs and lesser ecosystem services provision are
more likely to enter. The latter type of participant is also more likely to enter land into the PES
program that would not have been deforested.
Untargeted PES, monitoring costs, and uncertain proxies are inter-linked in increasing
transaction costs for the user-financed program. An untargeted program and uncertain proxies can
result in payments being overpaid, payments made for land not providing additional provision, and
makes monitoring more difficult.

Table 17: Findings of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

High Transaction
Cost
Elements

Low Transaction Cost
Elements
Costa Rica

4

2

Los Negros Valley,
Bolivia

2

3

The Costa Rica’s National PES program had 4 indicators considered to be of low
transaction costs and 3 considered to be of high transaction costs. Los Negros Valley Bolivia
Reciprocal Watershed Agreements had 3 indicators considered to be of low transaction costs and
3 considered to be of high transaction costs.
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4.4

Weighted Scores
Weights were applied to the scores for the Environmental and Equity categories, with greater

weights placed on the compliance and enforcement, and the monitoring sub-categories. Higher
weights were placed on the compliance and enforcement and monitoring indicating greater
importance in achieving environmental effectiveness than the other sub-categories. The two subcategories were assessed as critical to enabling Environmental Effectiveness as without
compliance, enforcement and monitoring, a PES program would be ineffective in accounting
whether there has been the provision of additional ecosystem services.
As indicated in Table 18, the compliance and enforcement sub-category raw scores were
weighed by 35% and the monitoring sub-category raw scores were weighted by 30%.

Table 18: Weighted Matrix for Environmental Effectiveness – Costa Rica PES Program and Los Negros,
Bolivia RWA

Sub-Categories
Policy/Institutional
Compliance &
Enforcement
Monitoring
Sustainability of the
provision of the
Ecosystem services

Environmental Effectiveness – Weighted Scores
Los
Costa
Negros,
Rica PES
Weight
Weighted
Bolivia
Raw
(%)
score
RWA Raw
Score
Score
2
15
30
1
2
35
70
1
1
30
30
1
1
20
100

20
150
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1

Weight
(%)

Weighted
Score

15

15

35
30

35
30

20
100

20
100

Weighted Score for Environmental Effectiveness
Sustainability of the
provision of the Ecosystem services
Monitoring
Compliance &
Enforcement
Policy/Insitutional
0

10

Costa Rica

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Los Negros
Bolivia

Figure 7: Comparison of Critical Sub-categories for Costa Rica and Los Negros,
Bolivia PES programs

The weighted scores for the Environmental Effectiveness category indicated that Costa
Rica’s PES program is better designed to support compliance and enforcement than the Los
Negros, Bolivia RWA. However, as figure 8 demonstrates, when the monitoring sub-category
scores were equally weighted across the two PES, both the Los Negros, Bolivia RWA and the
Costa Rica PES programs indicated that the program structures were equally designed to support
monitoring of the respective programs.
The Equity Category scores were similarly weighed with the property rights requirements
and the distribution sub-categories assessed as most critical to enabling equity in a PES program.
At the foundation of PES concept is the requirement of land ownership/title. However, the
requirement of property ownership also creates a built-in inequity in PES that has to be addressed
to create equity in any program. The distribution sub-category is also critical to the PES program
as it indicates who bears the costs and who benefits from the implementation of a PES program.
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Table 19: Weighted Matrix for Equity

Equity – Weighted
Costa
Rica PES
Raw
Score
Sub-Categories
Property Rights Requirements
Distribution

Weight
(%)

2
2
1

Social Legitimacy

Los
Negros,
Bolivia
RWA
Raw
Score
2
1
1

Weighted
Score

40
35
25

80
70
25

Weight
(%)

Weighted
Score

40
35
25

Weighted Score for Equity

Social Legitimacy
Distribution
Property Rights Requirements
0

10

20

Costa Rica

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Los Negros
Bolivia

Figure 8: Comparison of Critical Sub-categories for Costa Rica and Los Negros, Bolivia PES
programs

The weighted scores for the property rights requirements indicates that both the Costa Rica
PES and the Los Negros, Bolivia RWA programs structure are equally designed to address inequity
in the property rights requirements. Within the property rights requirements sub-category, land
title, communal land management and alternative land rights are listed as indicators in a PES
program. A PES program which allows for either communal land management or alternative land
rights along with the requirement of a land title scores as more equitable. Scoring only on the land
title being the established inequity in PES would be indicative of a poorly designed structure for
equity in PES.
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The distribution sub-category weighted score showed that the Costa Rica PES program
structure was better designed to support equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of the PES
than the Los Negros, Bolivia RWA.
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Chapter 5

Analysis

The findings of the study cannot be generalized due to the limited study conducted,
however the findings can provide relevant information and lessons learnt to improve policy
outcomes for PES programs.

1. How does the user-financed PES program structure differ from Government-financed program
in cost-effectiveness, environmental effectiveness, and equity?
Two case studies were used to analyze the program structure of a User-financed PES
program and a Government-financed PES program in their ability to support environmental
effectiveness, equity and cost- effectiveness. Existing PES theory is that user-financed programs
are better able to provide environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness than Governmentfinanced PES programs. The argument to support the existing theory that Government-financed
programs are less environmentally effective and cost-effective is based on the assertion that a userfinanced PES program is focused on achieving "environmental goals/effectiveness” in contrast
with Government- financed programs “often de facto come to politically drift into win-win spheres
of multiple side-objectives, such as poverty alleviation, regional development, or electoral
motives” (Wunder, 2013, 231).
Based on the analysis of the two case studies, however, the Government-financed PES
program had stronger indications of a program that is structured to support environmental
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effectiveness compared with the User-financed PES program. That result is in reference to the
unweighted scores for all sub-categories of the environmental effectiveness category.
Further analysis of the environmental effectiveness category where the scores were
weighted, and the compliance and enforcement sub-category was assessed as the critical element
to supporting environmental effectiveness produced a different result. With weighted scores, both
the user-financed PES program and the Government-financed program ranked equally in having a
program structure able to support environmental effectiveness.
Regarding cost-effectiveness, the Costa Rica PES program had a greater number of lowcost activities than high-cost activities, indicating that the Government-financed PES program was
better structured to enable a cost-effective program in comparison with the Los Negros Valley PES
program. In contrast to the Government-financed PES program, the User-financed PES had an
equal number of low transaction costs activities and high transaction costs activities.
The analysis for equity indicated that the Government-financed and User-financed PES
programs were equally structured to support equity in PES implementation. Notably, when the
equity scores were weighted and the property rights requirements sub-category was assessed as
the most critical to supporting equity, both the Government-financed and User-financed PES
ranked equally. This outcome is highly interesting as at the foundation of the Coasean PES theory
is the requirement of land ownership/title. However, within the property rights requirements subcategory, land title is not the only indicator. Indeed, the selection of the land title indicator only
would indicate a program that is not designed to support equity. The other indicators for the
property requirement sub-category are communal land management and alternative land rights
which are indicative of a PES program expanding property requirements to increase equity.
Therefore, a PES program which allows for either communal land management or alternative land
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rights along with the requirement of a land title is structured to be more equitable. Scoring only
on the land title being the established inequity in PES would be indicative of a poorly designed
program for equity in PES.
In terms of cost effectiveness, it is an accepted reality that there are trade-offs between
cost-effectiveness and equity. However, where equity strategies may on the surface increase
transaction costs, the same strategies lend to environmental effectiveness and lower transaction
costs in other areas. A PES program that has low social legitimacy, has a high probability of not
achieving its environmental objectives as issues of trust and conflict may arise (Martin, GrossCamp, Kebede and McGuire, 2014, 224), requiring more monitoring efforts and other
interventions, therefore, increasing transaction costs. Further, where the distributional benefits of
PES appear to promote unfairness and further marginalize the poor, these communities may further
seek to engage in activities which undermine the PES goal in adjacent properties creating leakage.
The analysis showed that the Government-financed program was better structured to
support environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness than the user-financed program.
However, weighted scores identified that both programs are equally strong in program structure
elements that significantly contribute to environmental effectiveness and equity. From the two
case study results, there is no inherent bias that a user-financed PES program is a better-structured
program over a Government-financed program.

2. Does the program structure or institutional design of payment for ecosystem services determine
whether equity is planned for in the design of PES program?
For the case studies in this research, the program structure of the PES program was a factor
in whether equity is planned for and integrated into the design of the program. In the Costa Rica
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Government-financed PES, the principles of the country’s overarching National Development
Plan was integrated into the PES design, influencing the payment structure, prioritization of equity
targets along with conservation targets and the intentional inclusion of small farmers through
acceptance of small properties in the program. The inclusion of special groups such as indigenous
people and the poor shapes the design of the PES in areas such as property rights requirements,
where communal land rights are legitimized and in the use of socio-economic data in targeting.
Equity strategies such as those integrated into Costa Rica’s PES program reduces “barriers to entry
that would exclude poor communities or landowners” (Salzman,2009, 54).
The User-financed program does not intentionally include equity considerations in its
implementation.

However, as the RWA target communities are rural communities, which

includes poor upstream providers and downstream users, socio-economic data is unintentionally
part of the RWA implementation.
A major failure to address equity in the Los Negros RWA is that the poorest and most
likely to degrade ecosystem services are not included in the program (Asquith, Vargas and Wunder
2008). The exclusion of this group has significant implications for environmental effectiveness.
Landless immigrants referred to as colonists squat on land not fenced or within conservation areas.
As these immigrants do not possess Government issued titles or the generational ownership
through purchase contracts, they are not included in the RWA. However, Asquith, Vargas and
Wunder (2008) contend that the landless immigrants deforest old primary forests at a higher rate
than “land owners”. Exclusion of the poor can significantly affect a PES program’s social
legitimacy and environmental effectiveness.
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The Government-financed PES in this study was better able to integrate equity strategies,
particularly recognizing and including communal land management as formal property right and
addressing distribution issues.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the program structure of two PES programs in the
program’s ability to support environmental effectiveness, equity, and cost-effectiveness. Two case
studies were used in the analysis: the Costa Rica National PES Program, a Government-financed
program and the Los Negros Valley, Bolivia Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (RWA), a Userfinanced Program. This thesis also investigates the role of the type PES program structure in the
inclusion of equity in PES design and implementation. Based on lessons drawn from the study,
the Government-financed PES program was better structured to support environmental
effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and equity. However, no conclusion was drawn that the type of
PES program, i.e. user-financed or Government-financed programs determines a better-structured
program. Critically, the Government-financed PES program attempts to address the inherent
inequity of PES in the requirement of property rights. Property rights is a major barrier for the
poor to enter into PES. The recognition of communal land rights and the regularization of longterm settlers to formal land ownership in the Costa Rica National PES program was a significant
strategy to removing barriers for the poor from entering PES. The inherent equity remains in the
User-financed PES scheme despite the tangible effect on environmental effectiveness
Secondly, Government-financed PES programs face stronger political and social
legitimacy pressures to integrate equity into PES. For User-financed PES programs where the
buyers are the Users of the ecosystems services, equity may be a secondary issue over
environmental effectiveness and cost efficiency. the Los Negros Valley RWA indicates, failure
to address equity can reduce the environmental effectiveness and increase costs. Addressing
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equity as a critical part of PES is beneficial to achieving environmental effectiveness and reducing
costs.
Thirdly and significantly, in regards to achieving the policy outcomes of environmental
effectiveness and cost effectiveness, the type of program structure is not the determining factor.
The Costa Rica National PES program demonstrated a more adaptive and flexible management
approach, changing its approaches implemented earlier in the program to improve environmental
and cost-effectiveness through spatial targeting, differentiated payments and bundling of services.
As far as can be determined, the Los Negros Valley RWA has not had the same pace of change.
Lastly, achieving the policy outcomes of environmental effectiveness and equity requires
trade-offs in cost effectiveness. Particularly, the inclusion of equity as a policy outcome and not
a side objective has implications on cost effectiveness. Case in point is the inclusion of small poor
landholders which improves equity, but creates a high cost in transactions. Continued evaluation
and adaptation to findings can help to decrease costs and maintain and equitable PES program. As
Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) affirms, a PES program works in the long-term if the communities
benefit economically, socially and environmentally.
Undoubtedly payment for ecosystem services is evolving with environmental and socioeconomic context in which it is being implemented. Scaling up of PES is being promoted through
the REDD+ Initiative and increasingly developed and developing countries are implementing PES.
With the evolution comes evaluation of what PES should look like and who should bear the costs
and benefits. There is clearly an undercurrent to shift and modernize the theory of PES from the
Coasean approach which focuses on cost efficiency and environmental effectiveness to the
“Muradian approach” of a holistic approach to include equity as a key design element of PES.
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The gradual shift from the dominant “do no harm” or “the better off than before” approaches are
not sufficient as real strategies must be implemented to improve the distributional outcomes of
PES.

6.1

Recommendations

Based on the case studies investigated through this study, the following are recommendations to
integrate environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and equity in Government financed and
User-financed PES programs.
6.1.0

Recommendation 1:

Payment for ecosystem services programs must not be static, but

designed to create an adaptive and flexible program to allow for changes to improve achievement
of objectives.
6.1.1

Recommendation 2:

Equal weight should be given to Equity as a policy outcome in the

design and implementation of the PES programs, whether Government or User-financed. This is
particularly appropriate and necessary in developing countries where there is high poverty and
dependency on natural resources.
6.1.2

Recommendation 3:

Baseline data for bio-physical and socio-economic data must be

collected prior to the implementation of PES to reduce transaction costs (cost efficiency),
environmental effectiveness and equity. The data should be used to create a counter-factual
baseline. If a program is ongoing and no baseline data has been collected, a reconstructed baseline
should be attempted using secondary data. Additionality cannot be accurately measured either
through output or input performance without baseline data. Equity actions in PES program will
not be successful unless they are targeted and based on sound scientific data.
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6.1.3

Recommendation 4:

Priority areas for PES must be established and a targeted approach

to PES undertaken to gain additionality (environmental effectiveness) and equity. Untargeted
implementation of PES program does not work (Pagiola, 2011, 12) and expends costs where
provision of ecosystem services will not materialize.

6.2

Limitations
The inclusion of more than two cases would create a more robust study that would support

stronger analytical generalization. However, time constraints and limited case selection made the
addition of other cases a challenge.
A second limitation is asymmetric information from the case studies. FONAFIFO built
their web site to include statistics and other data that are sought by researchers and organizational
structure includes staff to respond to a public enquiry. In addition, a majority of the existing
literature on PES includes Costa Rica. On the other, Fundación Natura as a small non-profit, has
much less resources and lesser research information is available on the Los Negros RWA.
Thirdly, it was challenging to analyze transaction costs, particularly opportunity costs,
qualitatively. In this case, opportunity cost was included in the cost-effectiveness outcome. From
a qualitative analysis perspective, the determination of opportunity costs appropriateness could be
made from using literature indicating a threshold of what is considered to be low payment or high
payment. However, opportunity cost is based on the value of a forgone activity replaced with PES.
The true determination of whether the opportunity costs being paid is cost effective would be first
analyzed against the value of the forgone activity and compared with literature on opportunity
costs. However, data was not available to conduct the needed analysis.
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6.3

Opportunities for further studies

There are further areas of research that can be explored to expand on this thesis area, for example:
1. Analysis of the User-financed and Government-financed PES programs in a Developed country
in comparison with a developing country.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Types of payment for ecosystem services (adapted from Payment for ecosystem
services: Getting Started, A Primer, Forest Trends, The Katoomba Group, and UNEP, 2008)
Types of PES

Description

Public
payment These types of PES agreements are country-specific, where
programs for private Governments have established focused programs (as in Mexico and
Costa Rica). While specifics vary by program focus and country, they
land owners
commonly involve direct payments from a Government agency, or
another public institution, to landowners and/or managers.
Formal markets with These payment for ecosystem services programs are established through
legislation that creates demand for a particular ecosystem service by
open
trading
between setting a ‘cap’ on the damage to, or investment focused on, an ecosystem
buyers and sellers, service. The Users of the service, or at least the people who are
responsible for diminishing that service respond either by complying
either:
(1)
under
a directly or by trading with others who are able to meet the regulation at
lower cost. Buyers are defined by the legislation, but are usually privateregulatory cap
or floor on the level of sector companies or other institutions. Sellers may also be companies or
ecosystem services to
there entities that the legislation allows to be sellers and who are going
be provided, or
beyond regulatory requirements.
Voluntary markets also exist, as in the case of most carbon emission
(2) voluntarily
Regulatory ecosystem trading in the United States. For example, companies or organizations
seeking to reduce their carbon footprints are motivated to engage in the
service markets
voluntary market to enhance their brands, to anticipate emerging
regulation, in response to stakeholder and/or shareholder pressure, or
other motivations. Voluntary exchanges are also a category of private
payments (see below).
Voluntary markets, as outlined above, are a category of private
Self-organized
payments for ecosystem services.
private deals
in which individual
beneficiaries
Other private PES deals also exist in contexts where there are no formal
of ecosystem services regulatory markets (or none are anticipated in the near term) and where
contract
there is little (if any) Government involvement. In these instances,
directly with providers buyers of ecosystem services may be private companies or
of those
conservationists who pay landowners to change management practices
services
in order to improve the quality of the services on which the buyer wishes
to maintain or is dependent. The motivations for engaging in these
transactions can be as diverse as the buyers, as is explored further in the
step-by-step section that follows on finding buyers.
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Appendix B: Consent Form
CONSENT FORM
You are being invited to participate in a research study conducted by Tanya Williams-Daley for a
Master’s Thesis through the Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT). The thesis research is on
Environmental Effectiveness, Cost Efficiency and Equity in User-managed and Governmentmanaged schemes using Programa Face de Forestación (PROFAFOR) as a case study. I ask that
you read this form before agreeing to be in the research.
About the Study
As the administrator of Programa Face de Forestación (PROFAFOR), the institution/organization
plays a key role in the design of the PES scheme and is directly involved in its implementation. It
is in this vein that I would like to discuss with you, as an authorized representative of PROFAFORFACE, the key features of the payment for ecosystem scheme. While some of the information
being requested has been found in past research, I am gathering additional information to ensure
that the information presented in my thesis is as up to date as possible.
Procedures
If you agree to be in this study, I will conduct an interview with you. A questionnaire will be sent
to you prior to the interview. I can arrange a Skype call or an alternate media more convenient to
you where I would conduct the interview with you using the questions on the questionnaire. The
areas of interest include: (1) the scope of the PES scheme, including the number of participants
and acreage under the scheme, how participants are chosen, including if there is a pro-poor variable
in participants selection (2) the methods of payment in the scheme, how the scheme is funded and,
(3)how the scheme is monitored and how additionality is measured. The data collected will be
used to compare against best practices for Payment for Ecosystem Services using the variables of
environmental effectiveness, cost efficiency and equity/fairness.
The interview will take about 30 minutes to complete. With your permission, I would also like to
do an audio recording of the interview.
Risks and Benefits
I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this study other than those encountered in the
provision of general information on the scheme. There are no benefits to you, but the
recommendations from the thesis may be helpful to PROFAFOR-FACE.
Confidentiality
The information received from you will be cited to PROFAFOR-FACE. I will not include any
information that will make it possible to identify you.
Voluntary Participation
Your participation is voluntary. By participating in the study, you are indicating that you have
read and understood the information provided above and that you are willingly participating in the
study. Please note that you may withdraw your consent at any time.
Contact
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Please feel free to contact me at tanyamrlawilliams@gmail.com or 001-(512)963-2805 if you have
any further questions. If there are any questions or concerns about your rights or if there is any
concern about how the research is being conducted, please contact Ms. Heather Foti, MPH
Associate Director at email: hmfsrs@rit.edu, at telephone 001-(585)475-7673 or via mail at
Human Subjects Research Office (HSRO)University Services Center, Suite 240014, 1 Lomb
Memorial Drive, Rochester, NY 14623-5608.
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Appendix C: Questionnaire (Translated in Spanish as well)
I am currently completing a Master of Science Degree in Science, Technology and Public Policy
from the Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT). My thesis research is on Environmental
Effectiveness, Cost Efficiency and Equity/Fairness in User-managed and Government-managed
schemes using Costa Rica National Payment for Environmental Services Program as a case study.
As the administrator of the Costa Rica National Payment for Environmental Services Program, the
institution/organization plays a key role in the design of the PES scheme and is directly involved
in its implementation. It is in this vein that I would like to discuss with you key features of the
payment for ecosystem scheme managed by FONAFIFO. While some of the information being
requested has been found in past research, I am gathering additional information to ensure that the
information presented in my thesis is as up to date as possible.
The data collected will be used to compare against best practices for Payment for Ecosystem
Services using the variables of environmental effectiveness, cost efficiency and equity/fairness.
I would appreciate if you could take a few minutes to answer the questionnaire that you will find
attached. The questionnaire has been approved by RIT’s Office of Human Subjects Research as
being in accordance with the institution’s research guidelines. Any information collected will be
attributed to FONAFIFO and not to any person(s).
To complete the questionnaire, I can arrange a Skype call or an alternate media more convenient
to you where I would conduct an interview with you. Prior to the call the questionnaire would
be sent to you. The interview will take 30 minutes to complete.
Please feel free to contact me at tanyamrlawilliams@gmail.com if you have any questions. If there
are any questions or concerns about your rights or if there is any concern about how this research
is being conducted, please contact Ms. Heather Foti, MPH Associate Director at email:
hmfsrs@rit.edu, at telephone 001-(585)475-7673 or via mail at Human Subjects Research Office
(HSRO)University Services Center, Suite 240014, 1 Lomb Memorial Drive, Rochester, NY
14623-5608.
Sincerely,
Tanya Williams-Daley
MSc Candidate, Science Technology and Policy
Rochester Institute of Technology
Rochester, New York
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Questionnaire for Administrative Body
I. Administration
1. When was the PES scheme established?
2. What is the institutional and policy framework for PES?
3. Was the PES established to replace any legislation?
a. Yes. If yes, please answer questions 4 and 5
b. No
4. Which legislation or policy did PES replace?
5. What was the purpose of the legislation or policy which PES replaced?
6. How was the process of designing the PES approached, i.e, was there collaboration
outside of administrative body?
7. What is the financing mechanism for the PES scheme?
8. Is there a financial sustainability plan for the PES scheme?
II. Scope, Monitoring and Conditionality
1. What is the acreage size of the PES scheme?
i.
Original acreage __________
ii.
Current acreage _____________
2. What is the acreage size enrolled under contract?
3. How many participants/number of contracts are in the PES?
i.
Original Number _________
ii.
Current number __________
iii. Projected Number _________

4. Please fill in number of participants for each type. If type does not apply, please leave
blank.
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Participants in Payment for Ecosystem Services Scheme
Types of Participants

Number of Participants

Individual Landowners
Private Entity
Groups
5. What ecosystem service (s) are being targeted? Are these services provided as single
units or bundled?
6. Was a baseline established for the areas covered in the scheme?
a. Yes. When was the baseline established (year) _____
b. No
7. How is the scheme monitored?
8. Are participants given payments based on:
a. Proxy actions, e.g. hectares of forest not cleared, reforestation, etc.
b. Actual provision of the targeted ecosystem services
c. Other (please explain) ____________________________________
III. Eligibility and Participation
1. Are there intermediaries involved in the PES?
a. Yes. Please identify the type of intermediaries
i) NGOs ii) investors iii) community groups iv) other ________________
b. No
2.

Is there a contractual agreement for participants?
a. Yes. If yes, please answer questions 3 - 5.
b. No

3. What is the period of the contract? Do all participants get the same contract?
4. How is the contract renewed?
a. Based on provision of service(s)/compliance
b. Based on automatic renewal
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c. Other (please explain) ________________________
5. How is the contract enforced?
6. What is the rate of compliance with PES contract?
7. Are participants required to have formal land titles to participate in the PES scheme?
a. Yes
b. No
8. Have any indigenous groups with communal or non-traditional land ownership applied to
participate in the PES scheme? If yes, what is the rate of participation?
9. What variables are used to select participants applying to participate in the scheme?
Please circle all that applies.
a. eligibility based on land size. Indicate set land size range ________________
b. proximity to ecosystem service (s) being protected, etc.? c. Opportunity costs
d. Other
10. Was the issue of equity/fairness included in the selection of participants?

III. Payment and Financing Structure
1. Is the PES scheme based on a valuation study for ecosystems services?
a. Yes. What was value of ecosystems services in the PES? _____________
b. No
2. Are payments differentiated or standard across the contracts? If differentiated, on what
basis are payments made?
3. How are participants paid/incentivized for participating in the PES scheme? Please circle
all that applies and add any additional information?
a. Cash b. in kind c. training/capacity building d. extension services
e. Other (please explain) _______________
4. How is the PES scheme financed?
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